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The Section 514 Single Event Effects (SEE) Testing and Analysis Group has performed
a series of SEE tests of certain strategic registers of Intel's 80386DX CHMOS IV
microprocessor. Following a summary of the test techniques and hardware used to gather
the data, we present the SEE heavy ion and proton test results. We also describe the
registers tested, along with a system impact analysis should these registers experience a
single event upset.
V
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INTRODUCTION
Single event latchup (SEL) and single event upset (SEU) may be induced in devices
operating in space by cosmic rays and/or solar flare particles. SEL occurs when a cosmic
ray turns on a parasitic bipolar PNPN structure. Device malfunction with excessive
current and local heating are the result, ending in possible catastrophic failure. In
contrast, SEU is a soft error that occurs when a cosmic ray causes the data stored in a
circuit element to flip to the opposite state.
Obtaining SEE data for the Intel 80386DX microprocessor is of importance to the
NASA Microelectronics Space Radiation Effects Program (MSREP), because several
NASA projects are considering using this part. Most notable to date, Space Station
Freedom will use 80386DX-based computers for its data management system, and the
Small Explorer Data System (SEDS), a subsystem of the Solar Anomalous
Magnetospheric Particle Explorer (SAMPEX) mission, uses an 80386DX as its main
processor.
From an SEU standpoint, 80386DX registers can be placed in one of three
classifications: application level, system level or hardware level. Application level registers
perform functions which are not generally crucial to the integrity of a system. Two
examples are the extended source index (ESI) register, used to move blocks of data in
memory, and the extended BX (EBX) register, used for temporary data storage. System
level registers, on the other hand, can have a direct impact on the integrity of a system
should they be upset. Examples include the global descriptor table register (GDTR),
involved in system memory management, and the task register (TR), involved in task
management. The hardware level register classification covers everything that cannot be
directly addressed on the software level. These types of registers run the gamut in terms
of their ability to affect system integrity. Even though Intel has refused to release details
on these types of registers, a few can be tested. An example of a hardware level register
that can be tested is the group of 34 address latches behind the 80386DX address pins.
Appendix A summarizes all known 80386DX registers.
Previous testing_ concentrated mostly on the less important application level registers.
For this reason JPL has undertaken an effort to gather data on the crucial system level
registers.
ITorn Scott, Space Station Program, Data Management System, Systems Engineering andlntegration
Trade Studies; Single Event Test Method and Test Result for lntel's 80386, IBM Report No. 891BMX0215,
IBM, Manassas, VA (April 17, 1989).
80386DX OVERVIEW AND BACKGROUND
The Intel 80386DX is a very high performance Complex Instruction Set Computer
(CISC) microprocessor that at 33 MHz can execute instructions at a peak rate of 8 to 9
million instructions per second. It has separate 32-bit data and address paths that can
provide a peak throughput of 66 megabytes per second (again, at 33 MHz) while directly
addressing 4 gigabytes of physical memory. In addition, a sophisticated six-way pipelined
architecture alJows the 80386DX to perform instruction fetching, decoding, execution,
and memory management functions in parallel, with little or no time penalty.
The 80386DX is available in three speeds: 20, 25 and 33 MHz. Older 20 MHz and
possibly 25 MHz parts were fabricated using the Intel Complementary High-
Performance MOS CHMOS III process. All current versions are implemented in Intel's
1.0 micron double-metal CHMOS IV process. Inters literature puts the transistor count
at 275,000, but this may be misleading. Microprocessor Report's Michael Shter 2 indicated
that there are about 156,000 actual transistors used in the design. The discrepancy can be
attributed to Intel having counted all possible transistor sites on the die as opposed to the
actual number of transistors used. Intel states in its data sheets that neither version of the
80386DX can latch up because the CHMOS III parts are on an epitaxial substrate while
the CHMOS IV parts use twin-weUs.
Intel manufactures several variants of the 80386DX, which include the 80386SX with a
16-bit external data bus, the 80376 microcontroUer, and the two-chip 80386SL, which
provides a high level of integration for portable computer manufacturers. The 80386DX
die is mounted in a ceramic 132-pin pin-grid-array package with the lid on the same side
as the pins, presenting an awkward situation for SEE tests at oblique beam angles.
Although Intel does not second-source the 80386D X3, the market demand and multi-
biUion doUar software base have prompted several companies to reverse-engineer and
copy the 80386DX. These companies include: Chips and Technologies, NexGen and
AMD. On March 25, 1991 AMD was the first to formally announce their copy: the
Am386DX which, among other attributes, consumes less than half the power of the Intel
part, is fully static, and can be docked up to 40 MHz. The Am386DX is fabricated using
AMD's CS21S process and has a minimum feature size of 0.8 microns with 0.9 microns
as an average. To achieve a fully static design, AMD needed 4000 more transistors than
Intd used, for a total of 160,000. To provide comparison information, the AMD
AM386DX device was also tested. Its latchup (SEL) threshold occurred at LET=24
MeV/(mg/cmZ). This result led us to discontinue the test.
2Michael Slater, "AMD Formally Announces Aan386DX", Microprocessor Report, Vol. 5 No. 6, April 3,
1991, p. 6.
3IBM is licensed by Intel to manufacture the 80386DX and its variants, however IBM uses them strictly
for their own systems and does not sell them as a vendor. IBM, therefore, is not a second source in the
strict sense.
MODES OF OPERATION
The 80386DX has three distinct modes of operation: 1) real address, 2) protected virtual
address, and 3) virtual 8086. Following is a description of these modes.
1) Real Address Mode
In real address mode, the processor provides fast execution of 8086 instructions in an
unprotected environment; i.e., the program that is executing "owns" the processor and
can do anything it likes, including crashing the system. This mode of operation also
duplicates the 8086 segmented addressing model where logical addresses are combined
with segment information to form linear addresses which map directly to the physical
address space. Real address mode allows use of some of the 80386 enhancements such as
a few new addressing modes, access to some 32-bit registers and full 32-bit address space
with the appropriate software instruction prefixes. The original Intel 8086 only has 16-
bit registers and a 20-bit address space.
2) Protected Virtual Address Mode
This operational mode adds a new type of address translation, paging, and increases the
maximum segment size to 32 bits vs. the real address mode's 16-bit segments. Paging and
segmentation allow an operating system to translate addresses. On the 80386DX this
means that any logical address supplied by a programmer goes through a level of
indirection (segmentation), becoming a linear address. This linear address is then subject
to yet another level of indirection (paging), becoming a physical address which is used to
drive the address bus. This address translation mechanism is a very important concept,
because it allows an operating system to mark certain areas of memory as unavailable to a
task, or even invisibly mask out portions of memory.
The 80386DX can also implement demand paging to create a virtual environment for
programs. In this case, neither the program code nor the application programmer needs
to know how much RAM is available, or where it is located. If a program makes
reference to a nonexistent page of memory, the 80386DX will trap the reference and call
a page fault handler, which will then retrieve the desired data from a mass storage device,
such as a hard disk, and place it in memory. The previous memory contents are
effectively swapped with the data on the hard disk. The 80386DX can provide as much
as 64 terabytes of this virtual memory.
Multitasking is one of the most powerful features of the 80386DX. At the hardware level
it is designed to keep track of an almost limitless number of tasks. A task can be one of
many programs that appear to be running simultaneously, but in actuality the processor
allows each task to run for a certain amount of time before a task switch takes place and
the processor gives its resources to another task. Task switching is very fast, as only one
assembly instruction is needed to perform the switch, with the rest of the operation being
handled by on-chip hardware.
PrivilegeProtectionis implementedin hardwareon the80386DXand is a way of making
sure that unfriendly tasks do not affect the operation of other tasks (most importantly,
the operating system itself) that may be running concurrently. With this method, every
piece of code and data is assigned one of four privilege levels called rings, where ring 0
has the highest priority and ring 3 the lowest. The 80386DX automatically performs this
privilege validation on every memory cycle. This privilege validation takes form in five
ways: type check, limit check, restriction of addressable domain, restriction of procedure
entry points and restriction of instruction set. If the task is privileged enough, its memory
access will be granted. If not, the processor will deny access and generate a privilege
exception; the operating system will then take over and decide what to do with the
offending task.
3) Virtual 8086 Mode
Virtual 8086 mode, a sub-mode of the protected mode, establishes an 8086 execution
environment within the protected, multitasking environment of the 80386DX, thus,
allowing an operating system to execute multiple 8086 and 80386DX programs
concurrently.
TEST PHILOSOPHY
In this SEE test, as with all microprocessor tests performed by JPL, the test philosophy
is to isolate individual registers, load them with known data, and expose them to the
heavy ion source, while monitoring register contents. When an SEU occurs, the error is
counted, the device is reset to a known state (usually the post-reset state), and then set up
for the next possible SEU. This approach yields absolutely traceable data in terms of
which elements and how many bits are upset in an extremely complex device. Cross-
section and threshold calculations may be calculated with great accuracy and confidence
for a given set of device elements. This allows the system engineers to build an accurate
cross-section for a device from individual register cross-sections, based on the actual
device application. In the 80386, for example, the Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB),
which is used in paging mode, contains more than 1600 bits which have a major impact
on the total device cross-section. If the TLB is not used in an application (i.e. paging is
turned off), however, its cross-section may be disregarded by the systems engineer. This
approach also helps the vendor identify those areas of a chip that can profit by hardness
redesign.
Testing with an instruction mix, on the other hand, reveals very little information about
the radiation hardness of a complex device other than the fact that something happened
to it when it got "hit". The cross-section obtained with an instruction mix tells nothing
about individual dements of interest to the systems engineer. This is true for a number of
reasons: so many operations are occurring at many levels in an instruction mix that the
cause of an error, and a possible correction procedure, may never be determined; the
experimenter has no idea what the state of the device should be when an error occurs; the
device may be flagging errors when none are present after the first one, simply because
that first one sent the deviceinto an unknownstate;or the instruction mix maynot
representthenormaloperatingstateof thedevicein areal-worldapplication.
"AOK CIRCUIT" FOR REGISTER TESTS
The "AOK circuit", as it is informally known, is a circuit located on the DUT card which
examines the state of the DUT at the time the test system would expect valid register
data on the data bus. If the processor state is valid, a comparison is made between the
data bus and a constant stored in a series of four 2K by 8-bit EPROMS. This
comparison circuitry can compare byte, word, and double-word values that are byte
aligned on the data bus. If the comparison determines that the data is invalid, a signal is
sent off-card to a counter, indicating that a valid SEU has occurred. If the processor state
is invalid, the test card does not "look" at the data bus, but instead sends out a signal to a
second counter, indicating that an unknown portion of the DUT had been subjected to
an SEU and was not functioning correctly.
DUT CARD AND TEST SYSTEM OVERVIEW
Due to the high level of complexity of the 80386DX, and difficulties inherent in testing
such a complex device, a highly integrated approach to device testing has evolved. The
DUT card actually contains a complete custom onboard microcomputer and monitoring
circuitry, and as such becomes a part of the test system.
The test card is a 7.50" x 7.30" copper-clad vectorboard onto which the DUT and
peripheral circuitry are soldered and/or wire-wrapped. The copper cladding provides a
ground plane, which helps reduce "ground bounce" by minimizing ground inductance.
The DUT and peripheral logic are powered and monitored separately by Hewlett-
Packard power supplies using 4-wire techniques. The test card is controlled from outside
the test chamber by a Hewlett-Packard 16520A 50-megabit/second pattern generator. A
Hewlett-Packard 16515A one gigahertz timing analyzer can be used to observe the
behavior of the DUT in the beam. The test card, in return, provides signals that indicate
the status as well as the types of errors that have occurred. These signals are sent to a set
of digital display counters for external monitoring. This test setup can operate
synchronously at clock rates (at the CLK2 input) of up to 25 MHz while sorting and
categorizing errors at a rate of over 12,000 per second.
For reference, Figure 1 is a one-to-one scale drawing of the test card, and Figure 2 is a
test setup cabling diagram, showing all stimulus, feedback, and power connections
needed to perform a SEE test. Additionally, a complete test card schematic is included in
Figure 3.
TEST METHODOLOGY
During the test, the microprocessor will execute the instructions necessary to exercise the
appropriate register. These instructions are located in four onboard 256K by 8-bit
EPROMS that operate with no wait states. As few instructions are needed to test a
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register, and there are many possible tests (i.e., register and pattern combinations) it is
advantageous to page physical memory into the address space of the microprocessor. The
type of test to be performed is then selected remotely by the pattern generator which
selects the appropriate memory page. Program memory on the test card is organized as
128 pages, each containing 256 double-words. This memory is not decoded, meaning
that each kilobyte page wraps around many times, occupying the entire address space.
This allows the reset code to be executed at FFFFFFF0h, while non-maskable interrupts
can still be serviced at 00000008h, all in one page.
This paging scheme also gives the test system the advantage of being able to control the
type of instructions that the DUT can execute at any given time. The test system, as an
example, can dynamically change the page to one containing all HLT (halt) instructions
during the shutdown period of a test cycle, when the DUT is integrating errors. Should
the DUT come out of shutdown mode, perhaps due to an extraneous interrupt, and start
to execute code, the processor would be placed back into shutdown mode because its
entire address space is filled with halt instructions.
Also on-board the test card is the AOK circuitry described earlier and necessary to help
ensure the correct classification of errors.
As an example of a typical test run, the test system performs the following steps to test
the CR3:
1) The DUT is reset, synchronizing it with the test system and placing it into a known
state. The test card also sends a signal to an external counter, signaling that another test
sequence has started.
2) The DUT initializes itself then starts execution at FFFFFFF0h, which contains a
sequence of instructions that loads the CR3 with the desired pattern. Specifically, a
MOV EAX,[32-bit pattern], then a MOV CR3,EAX.
3) The DUT then executes a HLT instruction, placing it into shutdown mode where it
will lie dormant.
4) After the DUT acknowledges entry into shutdown mode, the test system changes the
memory page to one that contains all HLT instructions (i.e., one that is filled with F4h).
5) The test system continues to clock the DUT for a period equal to about 80 percent of
the total test cycle time. It is during this period that the actual errors are integrated in the
register under test.
6) The test system returns the original memory page to the 80386DX address space.
7) The DUT is brought out of shutdown mode with a non-maskable interrupt (NMI).
To acknowledge the NMI, the 80386DX must first get the NMI handler address from
location 00000008h in physical memory, which contains 00000100h.
8) The processorstartsto executecodeat 00000100hand is giventhe instructionsto
movethecontentsof CR3 outonto thedatabus.Specifically,aMOV FAX, CR3 thena
MOV DX, 5550handfinallyanOUT DX, FAX areexecutedto achievethis result.
9) At thepoint whenthe 80386DXwouldnormallytransferthe dataonto thedatabus,
thetestsystemexaminestheprocessorstateto verify that aproperlyahgnedUO write is
taking place. If the processor is not performing normally, the test card sends a signal to a
counter indicating that the processor was found to be in an invalid state, and takes no
further action. If the processor state is valid, the data bus will be checked for errors. If an
error is noted the test card increments the external "valid SEU" counter.
10) The test sequence starts all over again at #1, when the pattern generator loops back
and resets the DUT.
SPACE STATION FREEDOM'S OPERATING SYSTEM
The operating system chosen by IBM for Space Station Freedom (SSF) is LynxOS from
Lynx Real-Time Systems Inc. in Campbell, California. LynxOS is a
multitasking/multiuser operating system that is compatible with the two leading versions
of UNIX: AT&T System V and Berkeley 4.3 BSD. LynxOS also conforms to several
important standards: POSIX (portable operating system interface for computer
environments, IEEE 1003.1), real-time extensions to POSIX (IEEE 1003.4), and Ada
(the language of choice on SSF) bindings for POSIX (IEEE 1003.5).
During telephone discussions with George Kohh (Lynx Software Engineer), Mike
BunneU (another Lynx Software Engineer) and Paul Panepinto (Lynx Sales Manager) it
was verified that LynxOS would make use of the 80386DX's protected virtual address
mode of operation, with paging enabled. It was also ascertained that LynxOS was bought
"off the shelf' for use on SSF and would not be modified before flight. This last fact
makes system level register data even more important because LynxOS was designed for
real-time control applications on Earth where SEE is not a problem. Thus, LynxOS is
not "SEU aware* and would not protect the system from SEUs. Although, to be fair, it
should be pointed out that no operating system could possibly prevent all such damage,
but steps could certainly be taken to prevent some SEU related damage.
REGISTER DESCRIPTION AND SYSTEM IMPACT ANALYSIS
Below is a descripdon of the registers tested by JPL to date. Also included is a general
analysis of the system impact should that register become corrupted via an SEU.This
analysis apples to any operating system that uses the full capabilities of the 80386DX's
protected virtual address mode, including LynxOS. In the context of this analysis
"crashing" generally means that the 80386DX itself enters "shutdown mode", which can
happen for several reasons. As an example, if another exception occurs while the
80386DX is processing a double-fault exception it would signal that shutdown was
imminent and immediately do so. To protect the overall system, an operating system can
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alsoinitiate shutdown mode by executing a HLT instruction from ring 0. A 80386DX in
shutdown mode would require a non-maskable interrupt or reset before it would begin to
execute instructions again.
CONTROL REGISTER 3 (CR3)
The CR3 is a system level register containing the 32-bit, page aligned, physical base
address of the page directory. For this reason, it also is sometimes called the Page
Directory Base Register (PDBR), which is a data structure in memory that contains an
array of 32-bit linear addresses. These addresses point to yet another data structure in
memory called a page table, containing an array of 32-bit physical addresses. The
operating system has the option of having one global page directory for all tasks, one
page directory for each task or somewhere in between the two.
To translate a linear address to a physical address the 80386DX's paging hardware must
perform many steps. The first step is to receive a 32-bit linear address from the
segmentation hardware and split it into three components: a 10-bit page directory offset,
a 10-bit page table offset, and a 12-bit page frame offset. Using the contents of the CR3
as a base address and the page directory offset as a pointer, the paging hardware looks up
a page table base address in the page directory. The paging hardware then uses the page
table offset to look up an entry in the selected page table. This entire process is outlined
in Figure 4.
CONTROL REGISTER 3 (_ _
] PAGE DIRECTORY
I BASEADDRESSI 1 --iv
LINEAR ADDRESS FROM SEGMENTATION UNIT
OFFSET OFFSET OFFSET
PAGE DIRECTORY
PAGE TABLE
BASE ADDRESS
PAGE TABLE
PAGE FRAME
BASE ADDRESS
,,(_,
PAGE FRAME
Figure 4. Page Translation
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Should the CR3 experience a single event upset, the current task would lose track of all
page tables and do anything from causing a protection violation to crashing the entire
operating system. The amount of damage caused to the system would depend largely on
the privilege level of the task that experiences the error and the amount of "intelligence"
built into the operating system to detect and, if possible, correct such occurrences.
As an example, the operating system, which operates at the highest privilege level (i.e.,
ring 0), could easily crash if it lost track of some, or all, of its data and code. On the other
hand, if an application running at the lowest privilege (i.e., ring 3) lost its data and code,
that application would eventually cause an exception that would have to be handled by
one of the operating system's exception handlers. The operating system could be
unaffected if the protection violation initiated a task switch which caused the CR3 to be
reloaded with a valid address from the fault handler's Task State Segment (TSS - a type
of segment saving processor state information needed to restore a task). If the protection
fault does not cause the CR3 to be reloaded, which would occur for example, if the fault
handler were called through a call gate, the operating system itself would become subject
to a corrupted CR3.
Because all page lookups are cached (see TLB, below), the possibility arises that all page
information for a given task would reside in the TLB. This would happen if the sum of
all pages were no greater than 128 kbytes (32 pages x 4 kbytes per page). In this case the
system would be unaffected because CR3 would eventually be refreshed from that task's
TSS upon successive task switches.
All 32 bits of CR3 were tested with either an all ones, all zeros, checkerboard
(A.AAAA.AJLAh), or inverse checkerboard (55555555h) pattern. While testing, the
pattern was present in CR3 eighty percent of the time. The other twenty percent of the
time was devoted to initializing the processor after reset and executing the actual code
necessary to get information into and out of CR3. It should be noted that because the
page directory must be page aligned, the 12 least significant bits of CR3 are assumed to
be zero by the 80386DX and are ignored.
TRANSLATION LOOKASIDE BUFFER (TLB)
The TLB is a four-way set-associative 32-entry cache that buffers page table accesses.
Without this buffering, the 80386's paging hardware would have to access two levels of
tables for each memory access, an unacceptable performance penalty. Each entry in the
TLB holds the upper twenty bits of a linear address, the upper twenty bits of the
associated physical address and some tag bits used for data protection and cache
implementation. The linear address field and tag bits are implemented in content-
addressable memory (CAM) while the physical address field is implemented using
random access memory (RAM).
One cache entry from each of the four sets was tested. All forty bits of the linear and
physical address fields from this entry were tested using either an all ones, all zeros,
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checkerboard(AAAAAAAAh), or inversecheckerboard(55555555h)pattern.During
testing,the patternwaspresentin the cacheentryeightypercentof the time.The other
twenty percentof the time wasdevotedto initializing the processorafter resetand
executingthe actualcodenecessaryto get informationinto andout of theentry. Of the
approximately1600bits, 160bitsweretestedfor SEU.
GLOBAL DESCRIPTOR TABLE REGISTER (GDTR)
The GDTR is a system level register that holds the 32-bit linear base address and 16-bit
limit of the Global Descriptor Table (GDT). The GDT is a data structure in memory
that holds all non-interrupt related segment descriptors that are global to the system. A
segment descriptor is an eight-byte data structure which provides the 80386DX with
information about the type, size and location of a memory segment, as well as necessary
segment attributes. The individual descriptors are selected by an address offset stored in a
segment selector register. Segment selectors can only point to certain types of descriptors
to which they are matched. As an example, the Task Register (TR) must always point to
a TSS. In any 80386DX protected-mode operating system there must be at least three
descriptors defined in the GDT: null, code, and data descriptors. LynxOS, like UNIX,
does not support a segmented memory architecture and therefore would not likely have a
need to define a great number of descriptors in the GDT.
Should the 16-bit limit portion of the GDTR experience an SEU, the result would
depend on whether this 16-bit value was increased or decreased. Should the limit be
increased, the GDT would possibly alias, or overlap, another segment(s) in memory.
This aliasing would have tittle or no effect on the system because neither the portion of
the operating system that maintains the GDT or the task(s) that owned the aliased
segment(s) would know about this new limit. The task that owned the aliased segment
would just continue using it as it had before the SEU. The operating system generally
would not write new GDT entries in this aliased area because the maximum GDT limit
would be determined once, at boot time, and never exceeded. Even if the operating
system had a provision to dynamically allocate GDT space, it would have to first check
that it was not going to try to allocate memory that belonged to another segment. At this
time the operating system would determine that it would indeed overlap another segment
and either move the "offending" segment out of the way or relocate the GDT to a larger
portion of memory.
If the GDT limit were decreased and then a task attempted to use a selector value beyond
the new limit, one of two possible types of exceptions would be generated: a General
Protection Exception or an Invalid TSS Exception. The latter exception would occur
only during a task switch when the 80386DX would normally try to validate the new
TSS. If the operating system were SEU-aware it might incorporate some code in these
two exception handlers that would compare the GDTR limit with the correct value that
would be kept in memory. The operating system in this case would be able to recover
gracefully, with no system impact. If the operating system were not SEU-aware, the
operating system would lose all segments associated with the "lost" descriptors. Although
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it is easyto imaginethesystemcrashingundersuchcircumstances,theactualamountof
damageto the systemwoulddependdirectlyon the numberand criticality of the lost
segments.
The otherportion of the GDTR, the 32-bit baseaddress,is extremelyimportantto an
operatingsystembecauseit definesthe GDT locationin memory.If the GDT wereto
becomemisaligned,or lostaltogether,thesystemwouldbeput into a stateof chaosand
eventuallycrash.
All 32bits of the GDTR's baseaddressportion weretestedwith eitheran all ones,all
zeros,checkerboard(AAAAAAAAh), or inversecheckerboard(55555555h)pattern.
While testing,the patternwaspresentin the GDTR eightypercentof the time. The
othertwentypercentof the timewasdevotedto initializing theprocessorafterthe reset
andto executingtheactualcodenecessaryto get informationinto andout of theGDTR.
INTERRUPT DESCRIPTOR TABLE REGISTER (IDTR)
The IDTR is a system level register that holds the 32-bit linear base address and 16-bit
limit of the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT). This IDT, like the GDT, is a data
structure in memory that holds segment descriptors that are global to a system. Unlike
the GDT, the IDT can only contain interrupt or exception related segment descriptors.
The IDT associates each exception or interrupt vector with a segment descriptor for the
task or procedure which services the associated event. To look up the corresponding
descriptor, the processor scales the interrupt or exception vector by eight, the number of
bytes per descriptor, this value is then compared against the IDT limit. If this value does
not exceed the limit, it is added to the base address to form the 32-bit linear address of
the desired descriptor. If this value does exceed the limit, the processor will enter
shutdown mode immediately.
Should the 16-bit limit portion of the IDTR experience an SEU, the result would
depend on whether the 16-bit value increased or decreased. Should the limit increase, the
IDTR might alias to one or more different segments in memory. Aliasing would have
little or no effect on the system because neither the portion of the operating system that
maintains the IDTR or the task(s) that owned the aliased segment(s) would know about
this new limit. The task that owned the aliased segment would continue using it, just as if
the SEU had not occurred. The operating system generally would not write new IDT
entries in this aliased area because the maximum IDT limit would be determined once, at
boot time, and never exceeded. Even if the operating system had a provision to
dynamically allocate IDT space, it would have to first check that it was not going to try
to allocate memory belonging to another segment. At this time, the operating system
would determine that it would indeed overlap another segment and either move the
"offending" segment out of the way or relocate the IDT to a larger portion of memory.
On the other hand, if the IDT limit were decreased and the system was called upon to
service an interrupt whose segment descriptor lay outside the limit, the 80386 would
immediately enter shutdown mode, hanging the system.
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If the 32-bit baseaddressportion of theIDTR weresubjectto anerror,the IDT would
becomemisalignedor lostaltogether,the operatingsystemwould not beableto handle
interruptsor faultsandwouldeventuallycrash.
All 32 bits of the IDTR's baseaddressportion were testedwith all ones,aUzeros,
checkerboard(AAAAA.AAAh), or inversecheckerboard(55555555h)patterns.During
testing, the patternwaspresentin the IDTR eighty percentof the time. The other
twenty percentof the time wasdevotedto initializing the processorafter reset,and
executingtheactualcodenecessaryto moveinformationinto andoutof theIDTR.
EXTENDED AX REGISTER (EAX)
The EAX register is one of eight general purpose 32-bit registers on the 80386DX.
These registers are used to hold operands for logical, arithmetic and address calculations.
The EAX is one of the most widely used registers in the 80386, and as such may contain
anything from a system-critical initialization procedure pointer, a seldom-used non-
critical flag or no useful information whatsoever during the occurrence of an SEU. The
operational result of an SEU occurring in the EAX is, therefore, extremely unpredictable,
but has a high probability of not being catastrophic. Because the CPU mostly executes
tasks that are at high protection levels (i.e., higher ring levels), any serious error caused by
an SEU will be trapped by the operating system and cleaned up.
All 32 bits of the EAX register were tested with all ones, all zeros, checkerboard
(AAAAAAAAh), or inverse checkerboard (55555555h) patterns. During testing, the
pattern was present in the EAX register eighty percent of the time. The remaining
twenty percent was devoted to initializing the processor after reset, and executing the
actual code necessary to move information into and out of the EAX register.
TEST RESULTS
1) Heavy Ions
The CHMOS IV Intel 80386 was tested at the Brookhaven National Laboratory (BNL)
in May and July 1991. It received a partial characterization at room temperature at 25
MHz (CLK2 input) of five function blocks (see Table 1) for ions spanning a LET range
of 2.5 to 60 MeW(mg/cm2). All data were taken with ions at normal beam incidence
(theta=0), because the package configuration does not permit testing at oblique angles.
The data, averaged over two or more of the test parts (S/N 1259, 1260, 1261 and 1262)
and normalized to cross section per bit for each function block, are given in Figure 5 for
most of the seven test ions shown in Table 2. It was found during the test that all four
test sets of the TLB exhibited an identical soft error response independent of"all l's" and
"all O's" test modes, so the plot condenses that result. When a flux comparison (104 vs.
10 s ions/cm 2) showed no difference in SEU or SEL results (as expected), most of the
remaining data were taken in the checkerboard (CB) mode at the higher flux (10 s
ions/cm 2 per second for a total of 106 ions/cm 2 in -10 second runs).
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The data of Figure 5 show no significant difference in either partial cross section or soft
error threshold among the five function blocks tested. The data for LET=2.5 showed no
soft errors for any of the five function blocks for each of two devices (S/N 1261 and
1262) for 107 132 MeV O ions/cm 2 per run. Data for LET=60 showed only latchups
with large currents in the 300 mA to 942 mA range, which obscured any soft errors.
(NOTE: the latchup cross section was ~6x10 -s cm 2 per device for 320 MeV I.) The data
at LET=40 showed soft errors as well as an occasional latchup, so it is very near the
latchup threshold. One device was tested at 5.5 V and 4.5 V bias, with no significant
difference in response to the two bias levels. Note that the observed high current latchups
were of the classic, potentially catastrophic type caused by a single particle, completely
independent of flux, rendering the device non-functional. It should be noted that S/N
1259 was destroyed during testing due to latchup. Classic latchups are not to be confused
with small-current, "micro-latchup" phenomena observed by others.
The data may be summarized as: latchup threshold LET--40 MeW(mg/cm 2) with 5.5 V
bias and soft error threshold LET=3.5 _+1 MeW(mg/cm 2) with 4.5 V bias, all at ambient
temperature.
-- Tom Sco# was on-site for the May test. He has compared his IBM
data to JPL's for the EAX and TLB registers, and reports that the results from the two
organizations are nearly identical. He concurs that JPL's CR3, IDTR, and GDTR tests
are an important addition to the microprocessor characterization -- in part, because of
the critical nature of upsets that occur for those functions.
Table 1. Intel 80386 Function Blocks Tested
Function Block
EAX - Extended AX, general purpose register
*GDTR - Global Descriptor Table register
*IDTR - Interrupt Descriptor Table register
*CR3 - Control Register 3, Page Directory
TLB - Translation Lookaside Buffer:
Bits Tested out of Total
32 out of 32
32 out of 48
16 out of 48
32 out of 32
Set 0 40 out of 1632
Set 1 40 out of 1632
Set 2 40 out of 1632
Set 3 40 out of 1632
*Heretofore untested function blocks.
NOTE: An "all l's", "all 0's", checkerboard (CB) and inverse CB are available for all function blocks.
4Tom Scott, Private Communication, 1992.
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Table 2. Intel 80386 -- BNL Test Ions (May and July 1991)
LET [MeW(ml_/cm2)] Ion and Enerb_
2.5 132 MeV O
4.5 51 MeV O
7.6 194 MeV Si
13 153 MeV CI
Ran[_e (microns)
150
38
81
44
24 255 MeV Fe 44
40 285 MeV Br 37
60 320 MeV I 33
2) Protons
Proton data were taken at the Harvard Cyclotron in June 1991. Proton energies were 160
MeV (an undegraded beam used for only a few early measurements) and a set of 148, 90
and 50 MeV energy levels obtained by passing the beam through an appropriate
degrader. The lower energy beams yield a larger more uniform beam cross section at the
expense of a ten- to twenty-fold reduction in beam flux, and are therefore desirable only
when test conditions can accept the lower flux (fluence) level.
The test results for five parts are summarized in Table 3. In the first run with part S/N
1263, 1.4x10 al 160 MeV p/cm 2 were delivered to the "all-ones" mode of CR3, causing
two "not-AOK" soft errors. The "not-AOK" error designation refers to upsets of some
susceptible bits located outside the tested function block. A subsequent run of this part
for the same function configuration induced device failure (evidenced by tester runaway)
after 5.7x101° p/cm 2 for a total of 2.0x1011 p/cm _ --- or 15 Krads. This dose is somewhat
lower than the range of the total ionizing dose (TID) tolerance of 20 to 24 Krads
determined from IBM's Gamma environment s. For subsequent runs, the proton fluence
was limited to 10 to 15 Krads, and there were no further TID device failures. Because of
these constraints on total device fluence (-1011 p/cm2), there were also very few errors,
and the statistics do not determine whether they are occurring randomly among the five
tested function configurations shown in Table 1.
Slbid, footnote 1.
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Table3. Summaryof ProtonSoftErrorsfor Intel 80386
S/N Total Fluence Energy Not AOK
(1011 p/cm 2) (MeV)
1263 2.0 160 2 0
1259 1.4 160 1 1
1260 1.13 148 0 0
1260 1.13 148 0 1
1261 1.36 148 0 0
1262 1.7 148 1 0
SEUs Pattern Test Mode Failure Site
Ones CR3 only Unknown
Ones All 5 GDTR
CB All 5 ---
CB CR3 only C'R3
CB All 5
CB All 5 Unknown
Conclusion - The approximate overall cross section is calculated by adding up all the
errors and fluence for all devices given in Table 3. Thus:
6 errors / {(average -50 bits) x 8.72x1011 p/cm 2}
or cross section = 1.4x10 -x3 cm 2 per bit (148 MeV protons).
JSldl2/ dda_Y
Testing of the 80386DX microprocessor for single event effects (SEE) has been
discussed, along with the importance of this device to NASA's MSREP program and
individual flight projects, such as Space Station Freedom. The capabilities of this device,
as well as its widespread installed user base and available development tools make it
highly desirable as one of the core elements in sophisticated flight computers, and for
complex embedded controller applications.
JPL's SEE testing shows that the 80386DX SEL threshold with heavy ions occurs at
LET=40 MeW(mg/cm2). The SEU threshold LET--3.5 _+1MeW(mg/cm2), and the soft
error cross sections exceed 10 -6 cm 2 (100 square microns) per bit at LET=40.
A test with 148 MeV protons, representative of trapped proton and flare proton energies,
gives an SEU cross-section -- 1.4xl0q3cm2 per bit.
All tests were conducted at ambient temperature and worst case bias conditions.
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KNOWN 80386DX REGISTERS
SYSTEM LEVEL REGISTERS
REGISTER NAME # ACTIVE BITS / REGISTER WIDTH COMMENTS
Global Descriptor Table Register (GDTR) 48/48
Interrupt Descriptor Table Register (IDTR) 48/48
Local Descriptor Table Register (LDTR) 16/16
Local Descriptor Table Segment Descriptor 48/48
Task State Segment Register (TR) 16/16
Task State Segment Descriptor 48148
Address and limit of the GDT
Address and limit of the IDT
Points to LDT descriptor entry in the GDT
Cached LDT descriptor entry in the GDT
Points to TSS descriptor entry in the GDT
Cached TSS descriptor entry in the GDT
CS Segment Descriptor Cache
DS Segment Descriptor Cache
ES Segment Descriptor Cache
FS Segment Descriptor Cache
GS Segment Descriptor Cache
SS Segment Descriptor Cache
73/74
72/74
72/74
72/74
72/74
73/74
Cached CS descriptor entry In the GDT
Cached DS descriptor entry in the GDT
Cached ES descriptor entry in the GDT
Cached FS descriptor entry in the GDT
Cached GS descriptor entry in the GDT
Cached SS descriptor entry in the GDT
Control Register 0 (CR0)
Control Register 1 (CR1)
Control Register 2 (CR2)
Control Register 3 (CR3)
6/32
0/32
32/32
20132
System level control / status register
Not used - Intel reserved
Page fault linear address
Page directory base address
Debug Register 0 (DR0)
Debug Register 1 (DRt)
Debug Register 2 (DR2)
Debug Register 3 (DR3)
Debug Register 4 (DR4)
Debug Register 5 (DR5)
Debug Register 6 (DR6)
Debug Register 7 (DR7)
32/32
32/32
32/32
32/32
0/32
0/32
7/32
27/32
Linear breakpoint address 0
Linear breakpoint address 1
Linear breakpoint address 2
Linear breakpoint address 3
Not used - Intel reserved
Not used - Intel reserved
Breakpoint status
Breakpoint control
Test Control Register (TR6)
Test Status Register (TR7)
28/32 TLB test control
23/32 TLB test status
Translation Lookaside Buffer (TLB) 1632/1632 Paging cache
2O
APPLICATION LEVEL REGISTERS
REGISTER NAME # ACTIVE BITS / REGISTER WIDTH COMMENTS
Extended AX Register (EAX) 32/32
Extended BX Register (EBX) 32/32
Extended CX Register (ECX) 32/32
Extended DX Register (EDX) 32/32
Extended Source Index Register (ESI) 32/32
Extended Destination Index Register (EDI) 32/32
Extended Base Pointer Register (EBP) 32/32
Extended Stack Pointer Register (ESP) 32/32
Extended Instruction Pointer Register (EIP) 32/32 Points to next code segment instruction
Extended Flags Register (EFLAGS) 32/32 Application level control/status register
Code Segment Register (CS)
Data Segment Register (DS)
E-Space Segment Register (ES)
F-Space Segment Register (FS)
G-Space Segment Register (GS)
Stack Segment Register (SS)
16/16
16/16
16/16
16/16
16/16
16/16
Code segment descriptor offset In the GDT
Data segment descriptor offset in the GDT
Data segment descriptor offset in the GDT
Data segment descriptor offset In the GDT
Data segment descriptor offset in the GDT
Stack segment descriptor offset in the GDT
HARDWARE LEVEL REGISTERS
REGISTER NAME # ACTIVE BITS / REGISTER WIDTH
Math Coprocessor Instruction Pointer 48/48
Math Coprocessor Data Pointer 48/48
Math Coprocessor Opcode 11/11
Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) 207/207
Barrel Shifter 64/64
Pre-fetch queue 128/128
Instruction queue 96/96
Address bus latch 34/34
Data bus latch, output 32/32
Data bus latch, input 32/32
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